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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
A simulation-based risk assessment approach is presented 
and is applied to the analysis of abort during the ascent phase 
of a space exploration mission. The approach utilizes 
groupings of launch vehicle failures, referred to as failure bins, 
which are mapped to corresponding failure environments. 
Physical models are used to characterize the failure 
environments in terms of the risk due to blast overpressure, 
resulting debris field, and the thermal radiation due to a 
fireball. The resulting risk to the crew is dynamically modeled 
by combining the likelihood of each failure, the severity of the 
failure environments as a function of initiator and time of the 
failure, the robustness of the crew module, and the warning 
time available due to early detection. The approach is shown 
to support the launch vehicle design process by characterizing 
the risk drivers and identifying regions where failure detection 
would significantly reduce the risk to the crew. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The Simulation Assisted Risk Assessment (SARA) 
Project supports NASA’s ESMD through the use of physics-
based analyses to assess failure environments associated with 
space exploration system failures. Probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) techniques are applied in a top-down 
manner to identify key risk drivers of the system. Risk drivers 
that depend strongly on the physics of failure, or operational 
state, are assessed through analysis. Appropriate analytic 
techniques are selected through consideration of the failure 
scenario’s overall impact on the integrated system design 
through risk contribution, sensitivity of the results, uncertainty 
in the existing knowledge, and complexity of the physics. 
Simulation results are quantitatively inserted into the PRA. In 
addition to risk quantification, physics-based analysis adds 
knowledge about the response of the system to failures which 
guides future design and potential accident response decisions. 
The PRA is applied in an iterative process driven by, and 
constructed to impact, the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) design 
process. Assessment begins by laying out the mission 
sequence characterized by discrete and continuous mission 
phases. Each phase contains a series of “initiators” which 
represent a failure in the launch vehicle resulting in an abort 
attempt. The initiators are grouped into bins of similar types of 
failures, where similarity is determined by the failure 
environment resulting from the initiators. Likelihood of abort 
initiation is determined by the time and demand-based failure 
probabilities of the initiators. A dynamic PRA model was 
created to model the time dependence of the abort initiation 
and execution process. 
For each initiator, the subsequent failure propagation is 
modeled as a sequence of discrete events separated by a finite 
time step. The failure evolution begins with the initiator and 
develops until a fault, or loss of significant vehicle function, 
occurs. At this point in the analysis, the development of the 
failure environment from which the crew must escape begins. 
The entire failure development is modeled using combinations 
of empirical data, engineering models, and detailed first-
principle physical models. Specific model selection depends 
on the current state of knowledge about the vehicle, its 
operational state, the specific failure propagation, and the 
overall impact of the failure on the integrated risk to the crew. 
The failure timeline is used to determine the warning time 
available for the crew to abort from the launch vehicle. Abort 
success depends on the warning time, severity of the failure 
environment, launch abort system, and robustness of the crew 
module. 
The integrated risk model is run to identify the 
combinations of initiators and corresponding failure 
environments that drive the risk to the crew. Early in the 
design process, many simplifying analysis assumptions are 
required due to a lack of detail in the design of the system. 
Simplification is achieved by representing failures using 
bounding, or worst case, scenarios. Once the primary risk 
drivers are identified via the PRA, they are screened to 
determine if the results are artificially impacted by the 
assumptions. If this appears to be the case, the analysis inputs 
are refined through further analysis of the failure propagation, 
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failure detection, or by decomposing the initiator bins into 
subsets more representative of actual failures. The process is 
repeated until the modeling is adequate and the risk 
representation stems from the physics of the failure and abort 
process. 
In the current paper, the process is demonstrated using the 
ESAS CLV, shown in Figure 1, as a case study (Ref. 1).  
Figure 1 -, Crew Launch Vehicle 
Specific emphasis is placed on the use of physics-based 
models to characterize the failure environments that pose the 
greatest threat to the crew; blast overpressure, fragmentation, 
and thermal radiation environments are discussed in detail.  
 
These hostile environments arise when initiators result in 
mixing of the liquid rocket fuel and oxygen from the on-board 
oxidizer or atmospheric air, which in turn combusts. Model 
fidelity varies from the simple empirical equations to detailed 
simulations of blast wave propagation and interaction with the 
crew module. Results of the physical analyses not only 
characterize the environment such that quantitative risk 
assessment can be made, but they also provide key sensitivity 
information used to guide the vehicle designers. Examples are 
included to illustrate cases where the analysis assumptions 
turned out to drive the risk, requiring refinement of the 
modeling, as well as instances where the results depend on the 
physics of the problem and are insensitive to the modeling. 
2 INTEGRATED ABORTS ANALYSIS 
Ascent risk assessment consists of two elements—the 
reliability of the launch vehicle and the abort process should a 
failure of the launch vehicle occur. Figure 2 shows an 
overview of the current analysis framework. The top of the 
figure represents a typical mission timeline, or sequence of 
key events, pictorially illustrated in Figure 3. Mission events 
progress in time from left to right starting with loading the 
launch vehicle with fuel, loading the crew, launch, staging, 
main engine cut off, etc. Classes, or bins, of abort initiators are 
shown above the mission timeline. The width of the bins 
indicate the portion of the ascent mission where the particular 
risk drivers apply, and the height of the boxes represent the 
relative probability of each initiator occurring. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Abort analysis framework. 
Figure 3 - Representative ascent mission sequence. 
Each failure bin is mapped to a sequence of subsequent 
events that occur once initiated. The figure shows an example 
of an upper stage engine failure, broken into catastrophic and 
benign failures. Following the catastrophic failure branch 
leads to a sequence of events that begin with the initiator and 
end with the development of a resulting failure environment. 
The details of this progression allow for an analysis of the 
time taken for the initiator to lead to the full-blown failure 
environment. In the current example, the uncontained upper 
stage engine failure leads to a local explosion (i.e. of the 
engine itself) which causes a structural failure of the upper 
stage. Once the upper stage fails, the cryogenic fuel is released 
into the atmosphere where it mixes and explodes. The details 
of the failure environment are mapped to each failure bin and 
are discussed in following section. 
Once the failure progression, and associated propagation 
time, is established a point of detection can be estimated based 
on the vehicle sensors and detection algorithms. The detection 
point, when compared with the failure propagation time, can 
give the effective warning time to perform an abort. Detection 
confidence can be built by tracking the failure propagation 
which takes time that could be otherwise used for the abort. 
However, enough time must be spent to ensure false positives 
do not begin to drive loss of mission, and potentially loss of 
crew, probabilities. Figure 2 indicates the trade between 
detection time and false positives through the graphical 
relationship between the detection timeline and the failure 
development timing. 
Once detection has occurred a recommendation to abort is 
issued. The abort environment sequence shows the steps 
required to safely abort. The Launch Abort System must be 
activated, the crew must successfully escape the failure 
environment, the vehicle must safely orient and deploy the 
parachutes, and the crew must be recovered from the landing 
site. The combination of the initiator leading through the 
development of the failure environment, combined with 
detection and abort capabilities define the abort effectiveness 
for each failure mode, and subsequently the probability of loss 
of crew. 
2.1 Risk model 
Abort effectiveness is computed through the application 
of a dynamic, scenario-based simulation model. Figure 4 
shows the model with its corresponding inputs and outputs.  
 
Figure 4 - Ascent risk model with inputs and outputs 
The current model is implemented using the commercial 
GoldSim software (Ref. 2). The model takes the likelihood of 
failures, or abort initiators, as an input as a function of mission 
elapsed time. The current model represents continuous risk 
exposure through the appropriate failure rates and demand 
failures through single event failure probabilities. Each failure 
probability, and the subsequent failure environment, can vary 
with vehicle state or mission time. 
In addition to the reliability data, characterization of the 
warning time associated with each failure mode is input. The 
warning time can vary with each initiator and with mission 
elapsed time. 
Characterization of the failure environments is 
represented through a series of curves representing the risk to 
the crew due to each failure environment as a function of 
mission elapsed time (MET) and warning time. The GoldSim 
model associates the appropriate warning time with MET and 
failure mode and represents the risk due to each failure 
environment as a result. The three primary failure 
environments modeled include blast overpressure, debris and 
fragmentation, and thermal fireball. Each curve contains the 
effects of the failure environment combined with the 
robustness of the crew module.  
The model is run in a Monte Carlo mode and the 
statistical output is recorded. An average probability of loss of 
mission and crew are output, as well as contributions to each 
of the failure bins and failure environments. All of the output 
is tracked as a function of mission elapsed time as well. 
2.2 Physical Models 
The effects of failure environments are quantified through 
the application of appropriate physical models. Models are 
selected based on the sensitivity of the results to the 
environment, the uncertainty associated with the environment, 
and the physical complexity of the environment. In general, 
simple models are used to “scope” the sensitivities of abort 
effectiveness to key parameters. Pessimistic assumptions are 
employed to model bounding cases in early analyses. If under 
the current assumptions a particular failure environment drives 
the risk to the crew, the assumptions are re-visited typically 
through increased fidelity of modeling. Commonly, the risk 
decreases with improved analysis (because the deliberate 
selection of pessimistic assumptions to start), but eventually 
the physics of the environment bound the risk. Failure 
environments that, under pessimistic assumptions, do not 
impact the loss of drew estimates are not refined unless they 
are relevant to trade studies or specific design decisions. In 
this way, the modeling resources are focused on the drivers 
and unnecessary analysis is minimized. 
Blast modeling-The blast model predicts the risk to the 
crew given an explosive environment. In the current analysis, 
explosions result from the mixing and combustion of the 
hydrogen in the presence of atmospheric air or the on-board 
oxidizer. Complete model details can be found in Reference 3. 
The blast model predicts the pressure loads on the crew 
module structure given an initial blast “yield”, warning time, 
and vehicle state when the explosion occurs. The model is 
based on well-known vapor cloud explosion relationships 
corrected to represent launch vehicle operation. The primary 
adjustments are required due to the vehicle altitude and 
velocity. 
Propagation of the blast wave through the atmosphere is 
modeled using existing CFD tools. An assumed source is 
imbedded in the solution and the subsequent wave propagation 
is computationally simulated. Figure 5 shows an example 
solution. The wave front propagates into the freestream 
velocity until it catches the Crew Module (CM). The pressures 
on the capsule surface are stored so that peak overpressure and 
impulse can be extracted. The CFD simulations are performed 
at a range of flight conditions and yield assumptions so that 
correlations can be made to update the basic model. 
Figure 5 - Blast wave overtaking capsule. 
In addition, the structural limits of the crew module must 
be known so that the appropriate failure criteria are used to 
predict the risk. A finite element model is used to model the 
structural response under a variety of blast load cases. Critical 
deformations are found and the structural limit is predicted as 
a function of blast overpressure and impulse. Figure 6 shows 
the resulting P-I curve that is fed back into the basic model to 
translate the blast loads to structural failure probability. 
Figure 6 -Pressure-Impulse (P-I) failure curve. 
 
 
Ultimately, the blast model is used to produce a family of 
curves representing the risk to the crew as a function of 
mission elapsed time, explosive yield, and warning time. 
Figure 7 shows an example of the curves used in the integrated 
risk model. 
Figure 7 - Blast overpressure risk without early detection. 
Debris and fragments-In the event of a contained by 
missile (CBM) explosions or aerodynamic breakup of the 
launch vehicle, a debris field is created. The CM must avoid 
critical damage due to debris impact for a successful abort to 
result. The existing debris model is described in Reference 4. 
The model requires a description of the initial debris field in 
terms of size and velocity of the pieces. The model computes 
the trajectory of each debris piece based on the mission 
elapsed time and initial debris field. The debris trajectories are 
compared to the CM abort trajectory to compute a “debris 
flux” through the region occupied by the CM, which is 
translated into a probability of debris striking the CM. 
Currently the model does not include a CM damage model so 
each debris strike is assumed to result in loss of crew. 
 
Figure 8 shows debris field patterns resulting from vehicle 
CBM explosions at mission elapsed times of 100 and 200 
seconds respectively. The red lines indicate the debris 
trajectories and the black line traces the CM abort trajectory. 
As shown, the CM remains in the debris field longer than 200 
seconds that at 100 seconds. This results from a number of 
factors, but most noticeably the lower drag on the debris at 
later mission times allows the debris to maintain a higher 
velocity for longer than for earlier abort cases. The debris 
survivability is, as with blast overpressure, a function of 
mission elapsed time and warning time as shown in Fig 9. 
 
 
Figure 9 - Probability of debris strike due to first stage 
breakup. 
Fireball-Near-pad failures of the launch vehicle can lead to 
release and mixing of the fuel due to structural failure or loss of 
control situations where the vehicle impacts the ground. This scenario 
produces a unique threat because the vehicle is fully loaded with fuel, 
the vehicle has not generated sufficient velocity to leave resulting 
fireball behind, and the ground contains the fuel as it mixes. For these 
reasons, the thermal radiation due to a pad fireball is a potential 
concern, particularly to the CM parachutes once deployed. To 
quantify this risk, a simple fireball is modeled. 
The current architecture model does not predict 
significant risk to the crew due to the thermal radiation of a 
pad fireball. However, design changes to the abort system 
make this a potential risk contributor, so the fireball model is 
included in the risk assessment to catch future design impacts. 
3 RESULTS 
The integrated risk model is run to determine the loss of 
crew probability and the mission abort effectiveness. Results 
are presented in terms of mean mission numbers and are 
decomposed into contribution by initiator and as a function of 
mission elapsed time. Figure 10 shows the relative 
contribution of the initiator bins. Each bin is represented by a 
row in the plot. The blue bar represents the relative loss of 
mission contribution and the red bar is the contribution to the 
loss of crew. These are cumulative mission values for a 
baseline set of failure detection assumptions. The model is 
subsequently run with various detection schemes, failure 
environment severities, and robustness levels of the crew 
module to identify the sensitivity of the crew risk to design 
changes.
Figure 8 – Debris field and abort trajectories for failures 
at100 sec. (left and 200 sec. (right mission elapsed time 
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Figure 10 - Loss of mission and crew contribution per failure 
bin. 
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